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1 Introduction
Traditionally in economics, competition is believed to improve productive eﬃciency of ﬁrms and
increase social welfare.
1
However, it has become well recognized that in environments where
the standard assumptions do not apply, competition may achieve neither of these ends. For
example, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) argue that competition pressure exacerbated the moral
hazard problems in the savings and loan (S&L) industry in the U.S. by forcing S&L executives to
gamble on risky investments in order to survive. In a recent article, Shleifer (2004) argues that
competition encourages the spread of a wide range of unethical behavior such as employment
of child labor, corruption, excessive executive pay, and corporate earnings manipulation. These
claims clearly illustrate that the eﬀects of competition critically depend on the instruments ﬁrms
use in order to compete. If ﬁrms use unethical or illegal, socially unproductive means to gain
competitive advantage, then competition may not lead to socially desirable outcomes. While this
is theoretically plausible, empirically there is no study that bears on the relationship between
competition and unethical behavior.
In this paper, using a large dataset of Chinese large and medium sized industrial ﬁrms, we
examine empirically how product market competition aﬀects ﬁrms’ tendency to hide proﬁt. We
focus on proﬁt hiding for two reasons. First, as a way to reduce tax, proﬁt hiding is socially
unproductive, but can save costs for ﬁrms and hence increase their net proﬁts.
2
Hence, proﬁt
hiding can potentially be used by ﬁrms as a cost-saving device to gain competitive advantage.
Second, proﬁt hiding is a common phenomenon around the world and causes serious economic
1
This view has been expressed in the classic writings of Adam Smith (1976) and Hicks (1935), and many others.
For more recent analysis of the eﬀects of competition, see, e.g., Leibenstein(1966) and Machlup (1967). For an
insightful perspective on perfect competition, see Makowski and Ostroy (2001). The available empirical evidence is
weak, but in general supports the view that competition improves ﬁrm eﬃciency, see, for example, Porter (1990),
Nickell (1996), and Fee and Hadlock (2000).
2
Some forms of proﬁt hiding can be legal (e.g., taking advantage of loopholes in tax laws), others are illegal
(e.g., failing to report revenue). For our purpose, there is no need to distinguish them, since both are generally
considered to be socially wasteful activities. If tax rates are excessively high, it might be possible that proﬁt hiding
reduces distortion. However, this caveat is not central to our analysis.
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problems in many economies, even though its severity is likely to vary across countries.
3
We
study corporate proﬁt hiding of Chinese ﬁrms, because (i) we have access to a comprehensive
dataset of a large number of Chinese industrial ﬁrms, which allows us to assess the degree of proﬁt
hiding; (ii) there is broad variation in terms of both competitiveness and proﬁt reporting practices
in China; and (iii) recently the Chinese economy has become increasingly market-oriented, and
taken on an increasingly important role in the world economy. Thus, lessons learned here are
relevant to other parts of the world.
The dataset we use is maintained by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) and
contains ﬁrm-level information based on the annual accounting brieﬁng reports ﬁled by all large-
and medium-sized industrial ﬁrms in China from 1995 to 2002. We develop a novel approach
to test how proﬁt hiding is aﬀected by competition intensity and ﬁrm characteristics. Our main
empirical ﬁndings can be summarized as follows.
• Firms in more competitive industries tend to hide more proﬁts, all else equal.
• Firms positioned unfavorably in competitive environments, such as ﬁrms facing higher
corporate tax rates, ﬁrms facing more severe ﬁnancing constraints, smaller ﬁrms, and pri-
vate/collective ﬁrms, display stronger propensities to hide proﬁts.
We also ﬁnd that these results are robust to various measures of competition intensity, to diﬀerent
market (or industry) deﬁnitions, and to various choices of estimators and model speciﬁcations.
More speciﬁcally, we develop a simple model in which a representative ﬁrm with a certain
amount of realized proﬁt decides how much proﬁt to report to the government–which determines
its tax liability – and then invests the retained proﬁt to strengthen its competitive position in
3
For example, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service estimated that about 17% of income tax liability is not paid
(Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2000). In China, the National Auditing Oﬃce uncovered 13.39 billion yuan ($1.6 billion)
in unpaid or underpaid tax in 2002, and 11.89 billion yuan in 2003 based on a four-month, nationwide investigation
of 788 companies selected at random in 17 provinces and cities (The Asian Wall Street Journal, A2, September 20,
2004). It is safe to say that these cases of uncovered tax evasion represent only a tiny fraction of the tax evasion
in China. Using an innovative approach, Fisman and Wei (2004) ﬁnd evidence of tariﬀ evasion in China. Johnson,
Kaufmann, McMillan and Woodruﬀ (2000) conduct a cross-country comparison of the sizes of hidden “unoﬃcial”
economies, which can be considered as an extreme form of proﬁt hiding and tax evasion.
2
the marketplace. A ﬁrm’s expected future proﬁt depends on its investment and its competitors’
investments. The more competitive the industry is, the more future proﬁt opportunities a ﬁrm
will lose if its investment lags behind its competitors’. In equilibrium, ﬁrms under-report proﬁts,
and the equilibrium amount of proﬁt reported by a ﬁrm is a linear function of its true proﬁt. We
show that all ﬁrms will hide more proﬁts when the market becomes more competitive. This is
because as the market becomes more competitive, ﬁrms lose more if their investments lag behind
their competitors’. Thus, ﬁrms hide more proﬁt in order to have more funds available in order
to protect their competitive positions. Our model also predicts that a ﬁrm will hide more proﬁt
when it faces a higher tax rate or tighter ﬁnancial constraints. In such cases marginal returns from
hiding proﬁts are higher. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that within an industry, ﬁrms in disadvantageous
competitive positions (e.g., greater market entry barriers or unfavorable treatment in government
procurements) have stronger propensities to hide proﬁts than other ﬁrms.
A main challenge for our empirical analysis is that ﬁrms’ true accounting proﬁts are not
observable. We overcome this diﬃculty by computing corporate proﬁt based the national income
account system – that is, by deducting intermediate inputs from gross output. This measure
of corporate proﬁt can legitimately diﬀer from a ﬁrm’s true accounting proﬁt based on the
General Accounting and Auditing Principles (GAAP) because of diﬀerences in the revenue and
expense recognition rules of the two systems.
4
However, since both measures of corporate proﬁts
reﬂect a ﬁrm’s economic fundamentals, they should be positively correlated. We assume that the
technical relationship between the two proﬁt measures is not aﬀected by the competitiveness of
the market.
5
Subject to this assumption, our theoretical predictions lead to testable hypotheses
regarding the relationships between the variables of interest and the correlation between reported
4
The GAAP accounting system was adopted and implemented in China before the beginning of our sample
period 1995. The national income account system and the GAAP accounting system can diﬀer in many ways. For
example, not all gross output in the current year necessarily converts into ﬁrm revenue in the same year. Asset
depreciation rules can be diﬀerent. This implies that using the diﬀerence between imputed proﬁt according to
the national income account system and reported accounting proﬁt as a measure of proﬁt hiding is not correct in
our context. In the case of U.S., Desai (2002) presents a compelling case showing that there is an ever-widening
divergence between book income and tax income, and attributes this divergence to ﬁrms’ tax sheltering activities.
5
In Section 6, we conduct extensive robustness checks and provide strong evidence that this assumption holds
in our context.
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and imputed proﬁts.
The theoretical predictions of our model are all conﬁrmed by our empirical results. Speciﬁ-
cally, we ﬁnd strong evidence indicating that competitiveness in the market enhances ﬁrms’ proﬁt
hiding behavior. The estimated eﬀect on proﬁt hiding has the predicted sign and is statistically
signiﬁcant for several measures of competitiveness (the number of ﬁrms, concentration, or in-
dustry average proﬁt margin) and alternative deﬁnitions of industries (2-digit or 3-digit industry
codes) and markets (national or regional). The competition eﬀect is also economically signiﬁcant.
Based on our estimation of the baseline model, a representative ﬁrm in an industry that is one
standard deviation more competitive than the average reports (up to) 18% less proﬁt than an
identical ﬁrm in the industry with the average level of competitiveness (Section 5.1). Our main
empirical results are quite robust to alternative speciﬁcations. Overall, the evidence is strong
that competition encourages proﬁt hiding in our sample.
We also ﬁnd that after controlling for other characteristics, ﬁrms facing higher tax rates or
tighter ﬁnancial constraints hide more proﬁts. The estimated eﬀects of these factors have the
predicted signs and are statistically and economically signiﬁcant. Based on one estimation of
the baseline model, an increase of one standard deviation in tax rate reduces reported proﬁts by
about 10% relative to imputed proﬁts (Section 5.2); and an increase of one standard deviation
in our measure of accessibility to capital markets increases the share of proﬁt which is hidden by
about 2.6% (Section 5.3). Furthermore, after controlling for tax rates and ﬁnancial constraints
and other characteristics, ﬁrms that are competitively disadvantageous in other dimensions have
a higher propensity to hide proﬁts. In all cases estimated eﬀects have the predicted signs and
are statistically and economically signiﬁcant. Based on the same estimation, an increase of one
standard deviation in ﬁrm employment size increases the share of proﬁt which is hidden by about
4.8% (Section 5.4); and private and collective ﬁrms report 18.5% less reported proﬁts than other
types of ﬁrms (Section 5.4). Although the magnitudes of these eﬀects vary with the regression
speciﬁcation, their economic signiﬁcance is consistently large.
Governments in developing and post-socialist countries are often advised to implement market
oriented reforms aiming to promote competition. China has implemented such reforms exten-
sively – loosening control over prices, giving more discretion to state ﬁrms, opening the market
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to foreign direct investment, and easing regulations to allow entry in most industries. To be
clear, we are not trying to argue against competition or against policies promoting competition.
Rather, we argue that promoting competition is not suﬃcient to obtain socially desirable out-
comes. At the same time of promoting competition, it is important to improve the institutional
infrastructure in the economy so that ﬁrms do not easily use socially wasteful instruments to
gain competitive advantage. Moreover, policies that help equalize opportunities for all market
participants are important components of any reform strategy. While it might be useful to give
preferential treatment to some ﬁrms (such as tax breaks for foreign invested ﬁrms), discrimina-
tion can be quite harmful over the long run. Such policy discrimination not only directly reduces
the eﬃciency eﬀects of competition, but also causes long run deterioration of the institutional
infrastructure of the economy because ﬁrms that are discriminated against try to compensate
their inherent disadvantages with illegal and socially wasteful means.
Following Becker’s (1957) classical study of discrimination, Shleifer (2004) argues that if ﬁrms
treat honesty as a normal good, then their demand for honesty will be lower in more competitive
environments since competition reduces proﬁts. Our theoretical model generates very similar
conclusions to Shleifer’s. However, our analysis is diﬀerent in that we do not rely on income
eﬀects. We explicitly model ﬁrms’ strategic use of proﬁt hiding in competitive environments and
derive a rich set of implications on how proﬁt hiding is aﬀected by competitiveness and ﬁrm char-
acteristics from the equilibrium analysis of the model. Of course, we do not argue that income
eﬀects are irrelevant. In another related paper, Cummins and Nyman (2004) illustrate a diﬀerent
dark side of competition – competition makes ﬁrms (e.g., investment bankers) reluctant to act
on private information that is unpopular with consumers, resulting in socially under-use of valu-
able information (see also Harris, 1998). Our paper is also related to the literature that studies
the eﬀects of product market competition on managerial incentives and corporate performance,
e.g., Hart (1983), Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983), Scharfstein (1988), Hermalin (1992), and Schmidt
(1997). While Hart (1983) and Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983) show that competition strength-
ens managerial incentives to maximize ﬁrm value in standard moral hazard models, Scharfstein
(1988), Hermalin (1992) and Schmidt (1997) demonstrate that there can be countervailing eﬀects
so that the net eﬀect of competition on eﬃciency is ambiguous. The focus of our paper is diﬀer-
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ent, i.e., on the eﬀect of competition on ﬁrms’ incentives to engage in proﬁt hiding. Moreover,
while these papers are all theoretical, the main contribution of our paper is empirical.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section
3 then discusses our empirical methodology and develops empirical hypotheses. We describe the
dataset and our empirical strategy in Section 4, and then present the empirical results in Section
5. Section 6 examines robustness issues of our empirical approach. Concluding remarks are in
Section 7.
2 A Theoretical Model
In market j there are n+m ﬁrms, of which n ﬁrms are “competitively advantageous” and m ≥ n
are “competitively disadvantageous” (to be deﬁned below). To allow for ﬁrm heterogeneity
while keeping the analysis tractable, we suppose that all n competitively advantageous ﬁrms are
identical to each other, as are the m competitively disadvantageous ﬁrms. At the end of any
given year t, ﬁrm i has a realized proﬁt of π
i,t
. It faces a tax rate of τ
i,t
, and chooses to report
a proﬁt of πˆ
i,t
, resulting in an after-tax proﬁt of π
i,t
− τ
i,t
πˆ
i,t
. Misreporting proﬁt is costly to
ﬁrms (otherwise they would always report zero proﬁt), because (i) they have to invest resources
(e.g., hiring additional accountants) and time to take advantage of loopholes in tax laws; and (ii)
they may have to change their accounting and business practices to hide proﬁt; and (iii) they
face ﬁnancial penalties and legal punishments if caught by government auditing. For simplicity,
we suppose that the cost of hiding proﬁt is a quadratic function of the amount of proﬁt hidden,
that is, C = 0.5γ (π
i,t
− πˆ
i,t
)
2
, where γ is a positive parameter.
6
For simplicity we assume that ﬁrms re-invest all their retained proﬁts.
7
Thus, at the beginning
of year t+ 1, ﬁrm i’s available resources are given by
6
By assuming that γ is exogenous, we assume that tax enforcement is exogenous, and in particular, is indepen-
dent of competitiveness of the industry a ﬁrm is in. This seems reasonable in our context, because tax authorities
in China are not as experienced and sophisticated as their counterparts in developed economies. Our empirical
ﬁndings can potentially be useful in indentifying types of ﬁrms as more likely suspects of proﬁt hiding (e.g., those
in more competitive industries), and thus may help tax authorities improve their auditing strategies in the future.
7
Allowing dividends will not qualitatively aﬀect our analysis.
6
ki,t+1
= π
i,t
− τ
i,t
πˆ
i,t
Firm i invests k
i,t+1
to compete with other ﬁrms in the market, trying to maintain and expand
its market share. Such investments can take many forms, such as R&D, advertising and other
marketing expenses, discounts and promotions, or expenses to build relationships with clients
and government oﬃcials. Firm i’s expected future proﬁt depends on its own investment and
those of its competitors as follows:
8
π
i,t+1
= f (k
i,t+1
, k
−i,t+1
)
where k
−i,t+1
is the vector of investments by all ﬁrms other than i, and f is the ﬁrm i’s expected
future earnings. Naturally, f is increasing in k
i,t+1
and decreasing in k
−i,t+1
. For simplicity, we
assume f takes the following form:
f (k
i,t+1
, k
−i,t+1
) = a
i,t
+ b
i,t
k
i,t+1
− 0.5c
i,t
k
2
i,t+1
− g (k
−i,t+1
)− 0.5µ
j
(
¯
k
−i,t+1
− k
i,t+1
)
2
where a
i,t
, b
i,t
, c
i,t
, and µ
j
are all positive parameters, g is an increasing function, and
¯
k
−i,t+1
=
∑
l =i
k
l,t+1
is the aggregate investment of ﬁrm i’s competitors. The parameter a
i,t
represents ﬁrm
i’s expected future proﬁt that can be achieved without any additional investment. The parameter
b
i,t
represents the base marginal product of ﬁrm i’s retained proﬁt. The parameter c
i,t
represents
how fast the marginal product of retained proﬁt decreases as ﬁrm i’s available funds increase.
The last quadratic term captures the idea that in a competitive environment, the further a ﬁrm’s
investment lags behind that of its competitors, the further behind it falls in terms of market
share. In this formulation, the parameter µ
j
is a measure of the competitiveness of market j: the
larger µ
j
, the more market share ﬁrm i loses when it lags behind its competitors. The number of
ﬁrms in the industry, n+m, represents another measure of competitiveness: the more ﬁrms, the
more competitors ﬁrm i faces. In the above formulation, this implies that
¯
k
−i,t+1
will be larger,
8
Here the ﬁrm’s next period proﬁt should be interpreted as its whole future proﬁt stream with proper discount-
ing. One way to think about this is that we are studying a stationary equilibrium of a dynamic game in which
ﬁrms make proﬁt hiding decisions over time.
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thus the more market share ﬁrm i loses when it lags behind its competitors. Therefore, the last
term is the “competition eﬀect.”
Aside from this competition eﬀect, the overall marginal product of retained proﬁt for ﬁrm
i is b
i,t
− c
i,t
k
i,t+1
. For ﬁrms that have better access to the capital market and hence are less
constrained by liquidity, we expect that their marginal returns of retained proﬁts should be lower,
i.e., they should have smaller b
i,t
and larger c
i,t
. It is well established in development economics
that access to credit is very important for ﬁrm performance and economic growth in developing
countries (e.g, Rajan and Zingales, 1998, Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2004). China has experienced rapid
economic growth for more than two decades, but still has a very ineﬀective banking sector and
an ill-functioning stock market. Thus, accessibility to the credit market constitutes an important
competitive advantage in China.
In our model, we suppose that accessibility to the capital market is the main factor that
diﬀerentiates competitively advantageous and disadvantageous ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, all n compet-
itively advantageous ﬁrms have the same parameters {τ
s
t
, a
s
t
, b
s
t
, c
s
t
, π
s
t
} and all m competitively
disadvantageous ﬁrms have the same parameters {τ
w
t
, a
w
t
, b
w
t
, c
w
t
, π
w
t
}. Compared with competi-
tively disadvantageous ﬁrms, competitively advantageous ﬁrms have smaller marginal returns of
retained proﬁts, i.e., b
s
t
< b
w
t
and c
s
t
> c
w
t
. Their advantages come primarily from better access
to the capital market, but also from favorable initial conditions in other respects. For exam-
ple, competitively advantageous ﬁrms may have better market entry conditions (so investments
needed to enter markets are smaller and less important), or they may receive better treatment
by regulators and government, including for example better protection of property and contrac-
tual rights (so that expenses needed to build relationships with government agencies are smaller
and less important). Because of these advantages, competitively advantageous ﬁrms are likely
to have higher proﬁt than competitively disadvantageous ﬁrms (i.e., π
s
t
≥ π
w
t
) and to be less
threatened by competition than competitively disadvantageous ﬁrms (i.e., a
s
≥ a
w
). However,
these diﬀerences are not essential to our analysis. In a broad sense, competitively advantageous
ﬁrms in China likely have better tax treatments and face lower tax rates than competitively
disadvantageous ﬁrms, i.e., τ
s
t
≤ τ
w
t
. However, since we can separate out and control for the
eﬀects of tax rates, we will focus on the other advantages of competitively advantageous ﬁrms.
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Firm i chooses an optimal level of proﬁt to report, πˆ
i,t
, in order to maximize its expected
total payoﬀ:
max U
i
= π
i,t+1
− C = f (k
i,t+1
, k
−i,t+1
)− 0.5γ (π
i,t
− πˆ
i,t
)
2
From the ﬁrst order conditions, we get
[
γ + (µ
j
+ c
i,t
)τ
2
i,t
]
πˆ
i,t
= [γ + (µ
j
+ c
i,t
)τ
i,t
]π
i,t
− τ
i,t
b
i,t
− µ
j
τ
i,t
¯
k
−i,t+1
We focus on the symmetric equilibrium of the model. Speciﬁcally, all n competitively advan-
tageous ﬁrms choose the same πˆ
s
t
and all m competitively disadvantageous ﬁrms choose the same
πˆ
w
t
. Then the ﬁrst order conditions can be rewritten as
[
γ + c
s
t
(τ
s
t
)
2
− µ
j
(τ
s
t
)
2
(n− 2)
]
πˆ
s
t
= [γ + c
s
t
τ
s
t
− µ
j
τ
s
t
(n− 2)]π
s
t
− τ
s
t
b
s
t
− µ
j
τ
s
t
m (π
w
t
− τ
w
t
πˆ
w
t
)
(1)
[
γ + c
w
t
(τ
w
t
)
2
− µ
j
(τ
w
t
)
2
(m− 2)
]
πˆ
w
t
= [γ + c
w
t
τ
w
t
− µ
j
τ
w
t
(m− 2)] π
w
t
−τ
w
t
b
w
t
−µ
j
τ
w
t
n (π
s
t
− τ
s
t
πˆ
s
t
)
(2)
Solving these equations we get
πˆ
s
t
= d
s
t
π
s
t
+ e
s
t
and πˆ
w
t
= d
w
t
π
w
t
+ e
w
t
(3)
where for i = s, w, d
i
t
and e
i
t
are functions of
{
µ
j
, n,m, τ
i
t
, b
i
t
, c
i
t
}
. Thus, the amount of proﬁt a
ﬁrm reports is a linear function of its true accounting proﬁt. If d
i
t
= 1 and e
i
t
= 0 for i = s, w,
then all ﬁrms report truthfully. In general ﬁrms under-report proﬁts, that is, d
i
t
< 1 and e
i
t
≤ 0
for i = s, w (see Equations 11 — 14 in the Appendix). Clearly, the amount of hidden proﬁt,
π
i
t
− πˆ
i
t
, is decreasing in d
i
t
and e
i
t
. In other words, when d
i
t
and e
i
t
are greater, ﬁrm i hides less
proﬁt. For reasons that will become clear later, we focus on the comparative statics of d
s
t
and d
w
t
.
These parameters measure the degree of proﬁt hiding on the margin (i.e., ﬁrms hide 1− d
t
yuan
of proﬁt more if the true proﬁt increases by one yuan). Henceforth, the phrase “proﬁt hiding”
will be used to refer to proﬁt hiding at the margin.
We can prove the following results (all proofs are in the Appendix).
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Proposition 1 For i = s, w, d
i
t
is decreasing in µ
j
, n, and m. Thus, all else equal, proﬁt hiding
is increasing in the degree of competitiveness of the market.
In our model, a greater µ
j
or the total number of ﬁrms means a higher degree of competi-
tiveness in industry j. Proposition 1 shows that as the market becomes more competitive, all
ﬁrms report a smaller share of their proﬁts. Intuitively, we would expect that as competition
heats up, each ﬁrm would hide more proﬁt in order to avoid losing market share. Besides this
direct eﬀect, there is also a feedback eﬀect. When all other ﬁrms hide more proﬁts and compete
more aggressively, each ﬁrm has additional incentives to hide proﬁt so as to meet the challenges
presented by competition.
9
For the next result, we assume that n and m are suﬃciently large so that (n− 2)µ
j
≥ c
s
t
and
(m− 2)µ
j
≥ c
w
t
.
Proposition 2 For i = s, w, d
i
t
is decreasing in τ
i
t
and increasing in c
i
t
. Thus, all else equal,
proﬁt hiding is increasing in tax rates and in the marginal returns of retained proﬁts.
Proposition 2 shows that ﬁrms will report less proﬁts if the tax rates they face are higher
or if the marginal returns of their retained proﬁts are higher. With higher tax rates, one yuan
of hidden proﬁt saves more taxes, hence proﬁt hiding is more proﬁtable. With higher marginal
returns of retained proﬁts, one yuan of saved tax will generate more future proﬁt. In either case,
ﬁrms will tend to hide more proﬁts.
Proposition 3 Suppose τ
s
t
= τ
w
t
. Then d
s
t
≥ d
w
t
. That is, all else equal, competitively advanta-
geous ﬁrms hide less proﬁts than competitively disadvantageous ﬁrms.
Proposition 3 says that a one yuan increase of true proﬁt leads to more reported proﬁt
from a competitively advantageous ﬁrm than from a competitively disadvantageous ﬁrm.
10
The
9
Technically, this game features strategic complementarities: the marginal beneﬁt of proﬁt hiding for one ﬁrm
is increasing in the amount of proﬁt hiding by its competitors.
10
The reversed causality, i.e., that ﬁrms become competitively advantageous because they pay more taxes and
thus are better treated by governments, is not likely. Government agencies at diﬀerent levels (from central to
provincial to city) that aﬀect ﬁrms’ competitive positions (e.g., procurement, regulations) are separate from tax
collection agencies (mostly at the central government level). It is unlikely they coordinate to reward ﬁrms who
pay more taxes.
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reason is that with better access to the capital market, competitively advantageous ﬁrms are
able to compete more aggressively without relying heavily on (costly) proﬁt hiding. Note that
Propositions 2 and 3 have diﬀerent empirical implications. Proposition 2 is about comparative
statics with regards to ﬁrms’ own characteristics, while Proposition 3 focuses on ﬁrms’ relative
positions in the industry.
3 Empirical Methodology and Testable Hypotheses
If all variables were observable, then a straightforward test of our model would be simply to
estimate equation (3) as follows:
πˆ
i,t
= d
i,t
π
i,t
+ e
i,t
+ 
i,t
(4)
with some appropriately chosen functional forms for d
i,t
(
µ
j
, n,m, τ
i
t
, b
i
t
, c
i
t
)
and e
i,t
(
µ
j
, n,m, τ
i
t
, b
i
t
, c
i
t
)
,
and with the standard assumption that 
i,t
is uncorrelated with either d
i,t
or e
i,t
. The estimation
results would then allow us to directly test the comparative statics results of Propositions 1-3.
However, the main challenge for our empirical analysis is that ﬁrms’ true proﬁts π
i,t
are not
observable. To overcome this diﬃculty, we adopt the following approach.
Using the NBS database, which we will detail in Section 4, we compute ﬁrm i’s corporate
proﬁt PRO
i,t
in year t according to the national income accounting system as follows:
PRO
i,t
= Y
i,t
−MED
i,t
− FC
i,t
−WAGE
i,t
− CURRD
i,t
(5)
where Y
i,t
is the ﬁrm’s gross output; MED
i,t
measures its intermediate inputs excluding ﬁnancial
charges; FC
i,t
is its ﬁnancial charges (mainly interest payments); WAGE
i,t
is the ﬁrm’s total
wage bill; and CURRD
i,t
is the amount of current depreciation.
The variable PRO
i,t
deﬁned here is not a ﬁrm’s true accounting proﬁt π
i,t
, the proﬁt caculated
truthfully according to the general accounting principles. They diﬀer by the timing of when
revenues and expenses are recognized into income, because outputs and costs in the current year
do not necessarily convert into revenues and expenses in the same year. Diﬀerences inherent in
revenue and expense recognition rules between the two systems account for discrepancies between
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πi,t
and PRO
i,t
. Given the exogenous diﬀerences in the rules of the two systems, we suppose
that with a linear approximation, PRO
i,t
and π
i,t
are related in the following way:
π
i,t
= δ
i,t
PRO
i,t
+ η
i,t
(6)
where δ
i,t
and η
i,t
are ﬁrm-speciﬁc parameters that depend on ﬁrm production cycles, demand
seasonal shocks, equipment life cycles, ﬁrm locations (land valuation ﬂuctuations), etc. We
assume that δ
i,t
> 0, since one expects that ﬁrms’ earning fundamentals generally move PRO
i,t
and π
i,t
in the same directions and thus cause them to be positively correlated. On the other
hand, the sign of η
i,t
is hard to determine a priori.
Since we do not observe δ
i,t
and η
i,t
, we still do not know π
i,t
. However, by substituting
equation (6) into equation (4), we derive
RPRO
i,t
= D
i,t
PRO
i,t
+E
i,t
+ 
i,t
(7)
where RPRO
i,t
replaces πˆ
i,t
as the amount of proﬁt reported by ﬁrm i in year t, D
i,t
= d
i,t
δ
i,t
and E
i,t
= d
i,t
η
i,t
+ e
i,t
. Using linear approximations, we propose the following econometric
speciﬁcation for D
i,jt
(j denotes the industry of ﬁrm i):
D
i,j,t
= β
0
+ β
1
∗ Compet
j,t
+ β
2
∗ Tax
i,t
+ β
3
∗ Finance
i,t
+ β
4
∗ Position
i,t
+β
5
∗X
i,t
+ 
i,t
(8)
where Compet
j,t
is a variable that captures the level of competitiveness in industry j (corre-
sponding to µ
j
, n, and m in the model) ; Tax
i,t
(corresponding to τ
i,t
in the model) is ﬁrm i’s
tax rate in year t; Finance
i,t
(corresponding to c
i,t
in the model) is a measure of how easily ﬁrm
i can access the capital market; Position
i,t
is a set of variables that proxy for ﬁrm i’s relative
competitive position in the marketplace; and X
i,t
is a set of control variables that includes ﬁrm
characteristics, time ﬁxed eﬀect, and location ﬁxed eﬀects.
In order to test Propositions 1-3, we need to make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 δ
i,t
is not aﬀected by industry competition intensity.
Assumption (1) implies that if competition aﬀects D
i,t
, it does so only through d
i,t
, but not
δ
i,t
. This assumption is critical to our empirical strategy. A priori, one may wonder whether
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competition may aﬀect δ
i,t
by aﬀecting the timing of revenues (expenses) recognition. Speciﬁcally,
it might be possible that ﬁrms in a more competitive industry would face greater diﬃculties
in selling their products and converting PRO
i,t
into π
i,t
, which leads to a technical correlation
between δ
i,t
and competition. As a basic control for this concern, we include in all our regressions
a variable called RSALE
i,t
, which is deﬁned as the ratio of ﬁrm i’s sales to its total output (Y
i,t
)
in year t. Since RSALE
i,t
measures how eﬀectively ﬁrm i converts ﬁnal outputs into revenues,
eﬀects of competition on D
i,t
after controlling for RSALE
i,t
should be attributed to d
i,t
, not δ
i,t
.
Moreover, we investigate whether Assumption (1) holds in our context later in Section 6. We
will provide evidence that in our dataset, all major factors responsible for discrepancies between
PRO
i,t
and π
i,t
, such as changes in inventories, and current liabilities, and depreciation, are not
correlated with the competition intensity of the industry ﬁrm i operates in. Controlling for the
impact of these variables does not change our baseline results either. Moreover, we will show that
our main empirical results still hold after controlling for PRO in previous year. These robustness
checks indicate that the parameters δ
i,t
and η
i,t
capturing the technical relationship between π
i,t
and PRO
i,t
are unlikely to be aﬀected by competition.
Under Assumption (1), d
i,t
is decreasing in competition intensity if and only if β
3
is negative.
Therefore, Proposition 1 leads to the following testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 β
1
< 0, i.e., a ﬁrm’s incentives to hide proﬁt are positively correlated with the
degree of product market competitiveness.
Since equation (6) represents the technical relationship between proﬁt measures from the two
diﬀerent accounting systems, we expect that δ
i,t
is unaﬀected by ﬁrms’ tax rates, their access to
credit market, or their relative positions in the industry.
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This is because Equation (6) is about
a ﬁrm’s true proﬁt, proﬁt that is calculated strictly according to the accounting rules of the two
systems without strategic manipulation. The reported proﬁts contain possible manipulations,
which our model predicts will respond to competition and ﬁrm characteristics in a systematic
way. Therefore, we have the following hypotheses from Propositions 2-3:
11
Recall that we include the ratio of sales to total output RSALE
i,t
in all our regressions. After controlling for
RSALE
i,t
, δ
i,t
should be very unlikely to be aﬀected by those variables.
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Hypothesis 2 β
2
< 0, i.e., a ﬁrm’s incentives to hide proﬁts are positively correlated with its
tax rate.
Hypothesis 3 Firms’ incentives to hide proﬁts are negatively correlated with its accessibility to
capital market.
For proxies of competitively disadvantageous ﬁrm characteristics Position
i,t
, Proposition 3
implies that their eﬀects on proﬁt hiding are positive, and hence the coeﬃcient estimators in the
proﬁt reporting equation should be negative. For such proxies, we have the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 Firms with disadvantageous market positions tend to have stronger incentives to
hide proﬁts.
In the empirical implementation, we have a speciﬁcation for E
i,t
similar to that for D
i,t
as
in Equation (8). However, since we cannot determine the sign of η
i,t
in Equation (6) a priori,
and since E
i,t
= d
i,t
η
i,t
+ e
i,t
, our model has no prediction about how E
i,t
will be aﬀected by
competition or other variables. Thus, we do not have predictions about the signs of the coeﬃcients
in the estimation of E
i,t
.
4 Data and Variable Definitions
4.1 Dataset
Our main data source is the NBS database, which is compiled based on the annual accounting
brieﬁng reports ﬁled by all large and medium sized Chinese industrial ﬁrms with the NBS during
the period from 1995 to 2002. The Data Appendix details how this database was created,
structured, and cleaned.
The NBS database covers more than 20,000 ﬁrms in 37 two-digit manufacturing industries,
from 28 provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities.
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As shown in Table A1, over the
12
We combine the three adjacent provinces QingHai, NingXia, and Tibet, because of their economic similarities
and the small sizes of their economies. ChongQing is included as a part of SiChuan province, since it was separated
from SiChuan only recently.
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sample period, the total value added for all of our sample ﬁrms ranges from RMB 958 billion
to RMB 2013 billion, which account for 33.3% to 43.3% of the total industrial value added in
China and 14.4% to 19.2% of China’s GDP. Our sample ﬁrms hired between 26 and 38 million
employees during 1995-2002, which are about 10% to 20% of total urban employment over the
sample years.
The NBS assigns each ﬁrm covered by this database a unique legal identiﬁcation number. A
ﬁrm may leave, enter, or re-enter the database when its operation scale ﬂuctuates around the
classiﬁcation criterion of large and medium sized ﬁrms set by the NBS. However, we are unable
to track an individual ﬁrm if it leaves or re-enters the sample. For example, if a ﬁrm covered in
1995 did not appear in 1996, it could have gone bankrupt, or been acquired by another ﬁrm, or
reclassiﬁed as a small ﬁrm, or simply changed its ownership (e.g., privatization). This implies
that we have an unbalanced panel dataset.
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4.2 Proﬁt Measures
The NBS requires all above scale ﬁrms in China to report their accounting data on an annual
basis. The NBS database contains the pre-tax accounting proﬁt reported by each ﬁrm, which
gives the dependent variable in our regressions, RPRO. The dataset is used by the NBS to
calculate the Gross Domestic Product, and contains inputs and outputs information for all the
sample ﬁrms. This allows us to compute PRO, proﬁt from the national income account system,
as in equation (5).
In our analysis, we scale both PRO and RPRO with ﬁrms’ total assets (TA). After the
scaling, the sample mean of RPRO is 0.003 and that of PRO is 0.042 (Table 2). On average,
PRO is almost 12 times RPRO. However, as we argued before, the diﬀerence between the two
in itself is not evidence of proﬁt hiding. It could simply refect the exogenous diﬀerences between
the accounting system and the national income account system, as postulated in equation (6).
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Focusing on the subsample of observations with all 8 year data does not qualitatively change our basic empirical
results. However, it reduces the sample size substantially.
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4.3 Competition Variables, Industry and Market Deﬁnitions
Following the standard practice in the Industrial Organization literature, we construct four vari-
ables to measure competition intensity in product markets. The ﬁrst variable is the number of
above-scale ﬁrms operating in an industry, N , which is collected from the China Statistical Year
Books, 1995 - 2002. We use its natural logarithm, LOGN , in our analysis. The variable LOGN
corresponds to n+m in our model, and correlates positively with competitiveness.
The second measure is the industry Herﬁndal index, H − Index, which is the sum of squares
of the market shares (by sales) by the ten largest ﬁrms in an given industry.
14
As another way to
measure concentration, we also compute the total market share accounted for by the four largest
ﬁrms in an industry (by sales) and name it CONCEN . Both H − Index and CONCEN are
negatively correlated with competitiveness.
A fourth measure of competitiveness we use is the industry average proﬁt margin, PMARGIN ,
which is the ratio of total pre-tax proﬁt to total sales in an industry. As competitiveness increases,
one may expect that ﬁrm proﬁt on average will fall, thus PMARGIN should be negatively cor-
related with competitiveness. As a measure of competitiveness, PMARGIN is probably more
controversial than the others. We include it in our analysis to show that our main empirical
results are robust to diﬀerent measures of competitiveness.
Table 1 presents these competition measures for the thirty-seven two-digit manufacturing
industries in China averaged over 1995-2002. All measures show substantial variations across
industries. We report the bivariate correlations among the four competitiveness measures in Table
A2. As measures of industry concentration, not surprisingly,H−Index and CONCEN are highly
correlated; the correlation coeﬃcient is 0.847. LOGN negatively correlates with both H−Index
and CONCEN ; the coeﬃcients are −0.544 and −0.624, respectively. PMARGIN negatively
correlates with LOGN (correlation coeﬃcient of −0.233), and positively correlates with both
H − Index and CONCEN but the correlation coeﬃcients are quite small (0.053 and 0.090,
respectively). Overall, it appears that the four variables measure the degree of competitivness
quite consistently, yet oﬀer somewhat diﬀerentiated perspectives.
15
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As a robustness check, we also calculate the Herﬁndal index by total assets, which yields similar results.
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In general equilibrium, competition intensity in an industry is endogenously determined by ﬁrm behavior within
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Besides the measurement of competitiveness, specifying the appropriate scope of a product
market is crucial in gauging the competitive pressure ﬁrms face. In addition to the two-digit
industry codes, we also deﬁne an industry according to the three-digit industry codes speciﬁed
by the NBS. There are in total 138 three-digit industries in the manufacturing sectors in China.
Table A3 lists all of them. We calculate all competition measures except LOGN for every three-
digit industry, because we do not have the information on the number of above scale ﬁrms at the
three-digit industry level.
In deﬁning a product market at either two-digit or three-digit industry level, one assumes
that ﬁrms operate in the national market. Clearly this does not hold for all ﬁrms. In particular,
regional protectionism commonly practiced in China may limit a ﬁrm’s reach in the national
marketplace. One remedy might be to specify a product market as a two or three-digit industry
conﬁned to one single province or province-equivalent municipal city, which assumes that these
ﬁrms only operate locally. However, given their size and importance, the large and medium sized
industrial ﬁrms in our data are more likely to operate beyond the province level. Therefore, we
deﬁne a product market as a two-digit industry in one of China’s eight economic regions speciﬁed
by the State Council of China (see Table A4 for details). We compute H − Index, CONCEN ,
and PMARGIN based on this market deﬁnition.
We report the summary statistics of the competition variables based on the three diﬀerent
market deﬁnitions in Table 2. The two concentration measures, H − Index and CONCEN , are
very sensitive to market deﬁnition. As the market becomes smaller (from 2-digit industry to
3-digit industry, to 2-digit industry/region), as one would expect, concentration increases. On
the other hand, PMARGIN is stable with respect to the ﬁrst two market deﬁnitions, but is
the industry as well as behavior of other market participants in the economy. This may cause the endogeneity
problem in regressions. The existing IO literature does not oﬀer any solution to this problem, as far as we know.
We believe that the potential endogeneity problem with respect to competition is not likely to be serious in our
context. One reason is that the number of ﬁrms in most industry is quite large (Table A1), thus a single ﬁrm
should have a very small eﬀect on the industry competition intensity. Moreover, since the eﬀects of an individual
ﬁrm on the industry outcome diﬀer across diﬀerent measures of competition (number of the ﬁrm, concentration,
proﬁt margin) and across markets, the degree of the potential endogeneity problem should also vary. However,
we obtain similar results using diﬀerent measures of competition intensity and diﬀerent market deﬁnitions. This
suggests that the potential endogeneity problem is likely to be quite limited.
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quite diﬀerent when the 2-digit industry/region deﬁnition is used. This is likely due to the great
disparity in regional development in China.
4.4 Other Independent Variables
From our dataset, we construct the following variables of ﬁrm characteristics and report their
summary statistics in Table 2.
We construct a variable TAX from the ratio of actual corporate income tax paid by a ﬁrm
to its reported pre-tax proﬁt, and set it to zero for loss-making ﬁrms. Although the standard
corporate income tax rate is 33% in China, the Chinese government gives various preferential
tax treatments (e.g., tax reduction for a certain period of time) to various kinds of ﬁrms (e.g.,
foreign ﬁrms, high-tech ﬁrms, joint ventures) over the sample period. Local governments also
grant tax holidays and rebates to various types of companies in order to promote local economic
development. Furthermore, tax collection and enforcement is quite discretionary, leaving large
room for distortion and bribery in exchange of tax reduction. As a result, there is substantial
variation in the eﬀective tax rates across ﬁrms. From Table 2, the variable TAX has a sample
mean of 18.2% with a standard deviation of 26.8%. Note that a small fraction of ﬁrms have very
high eﬀective tax rates (the sample max is 87.2%), partly because they are seriously mistreated
and partly because there are tax carryovers from previous years.
It is diﬃcult to measure a ﬁrm’s access to credit markets. However, as the Chinese economy
has been growing at a very fast pace, Chinese ﬁrms’ demand for credit has grown, but the banking
sector and stock market have not developed quickly enough to keep pace with this growing
demand. Thus, the actual amount of debt a ﬁrm has reﬂects mostly how much it manages to
borrow, not its endogenously chosen optimal capital structure. Consequently, we expect ﬁrms’
access to credit and their debt to equity ratios to be positively correlated. Note that banks in
China have little discretion over interest rates they charge borrowing ﬁrms. Therefore, interest
payments on loans reﬂect how much a ﬁrm is able to borrow. Therefore, we compute the ratio
of total ﬁnancial charges to total assets for each ﬁrm, which is called FINANCE, and use it as
a proxy for the ﬁrm’s access to credit markets. From Table 2, FINANCE has a sample mean
of 2.46% and a standard deviation of 2.32%.
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We use two proxies for ﬁrms’ relative competitive positions. One proxy is ﬁrm size measured
by the logarithm of the number of employees, LNLABOR.
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Large ﬁrms are likely to be the
“competitively advantageous” ones in our model for several reasons. First, large ﬁrms have more
resources to compete in the marketplace, and hence they should rely less on retained proﬁts and
have smaller marginal returns from retained proﬁts (i.e., smaller b
i,t
and larger c
i,t
in the model).
Secondly, large ﬁrms have better access to the capital market, which is an important competitive
advantage given China’s poorly developed ﬁnancial markets. To the extent that the variable
FINANCE does not perfectly capture a ﬁrm’s accessibility to the capital market, ﬁrm size may
reﬂect some of the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints. Thirdly, large ﬁrms may also get better tax
treatments, and thus ﬁrm size may pick up some tax eﬀects that are not fully captured by the
variable TAX . Finally, large ﬁrms in China usually enjoy better protections of property and
contractual rights, better regulatory treatments (such as in international trade), and have lesser
market entry restrictions. The variable LNLABOR’s sample mean is 6.572 (corresponding to
715 employees) with a standard deviation of 1.06.
Another proxy for relative competitive positions we use is ﬁrm ownership, whereby we create
a dummy variable OWN that takes the value of 1 if a ﬁrm is either private or collective and 0
otherwise. Over our sample period, private and collective ﬁrms accounted for about 13.1% of
the sample (the rest consisted of state owned enterprises, mixed ownership ﬁrms, foreign ﬁrms,
and Hong Kong/Taiwan ﬁrms). For obvious reasons, private and collective ﬁrms in China are at
a disadvantage. Since private and collective ﬁrms in China typically do not have access to the
state banking system and are often subject to higher tax rates, indicators of private and collective
ownership will pick up some of the tax and ﬁnancial constraint eﬀects on proﬁt hiding which are
not fully captured by the variables TAX and FINANCE. Moreover, private and collective ﬁrms
in China have long been subject to insecure property rights, have been discriminated against by
various government policies and regulations, and have faced much higher hurdles in entering new
markets. For them, marginal returns of retained proﬁts should be quite high.
As mentioned before, we include RSALE, the ratio of sales to total output, in our regressions.
Its sample mean is 0.991 and standard deviation is 0.524 (Table 2). Also in Table 2, one can
16
Using the logarithm of total assets as a measure of ﬁrm size yields similar results.
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see that on average, our sample ﬁrm has total assets (TA) of 341 million yuan. Finally, we
create twenty-eight location dummies, and eight year dummies to capture the geographical and
time-varying eﬀects.
5 Main Empirical Results
Based on Equations (7) and (8), we estimate the following regression model:
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(9)
where d
year
is a set of year dummies, and d
loc
is a set of location dummies. Thus, our estimation
controls for time-speciﬁc, and location-speciﬁc eﬀects on proﬁt reporting behavior in our sample.
RSALE controls for any shifts in the technical relationship between PRO and the true accounting
proﬁt π.
We estimate equation (9) using four alternative measures of competitiveness of each of the
three alternative deﬁnitions of the market. Results are reported in Table 3. Columns 1-4 report
results when the market is deﬁned by two-digit industry; Columns 5-7, by 3-digit industry; and
Columns 8-10, by 2-digit industry and region. In each column, the heading identiﬁes the measure
of competitiveness which is used in the regression. To save space, only the estimated coeﬃcients
of interest are reported. We report t-statistics in brackets, computed from robust standard errors.
5.1 Does Competition Enhance Incentives to Hide Proﬁts?
The main objective of the paper is to investigate whether competition encourages proﬁt hiding.
Our Hypothesis 1 says that all else equal, ﬁrms hide more proﬁt (report less proﬁts) as the market
17
Since we include OWN and location dummies in the constant term, a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect model is not applicable
here. However, when we exclude OWN and location dummies and add ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect in the constant term, we
ﬁnd qualitatively similar results.
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becomes more competitive. As is evident from Table 3, this hypothesis is strongly supported by
our regression results. The estimated coeﬃcient for Competition× PRO, β
1
in Equation (9), is
negative when LOGN is used as the measure of competition intensity, and is positive in all other
cases (higher H − Index, CONCEN and PMARGIN all indicate less competition). In all the
regressions, the estimated β
1
is statistically very signiﬁcant. The evidence here shows that ﬁrms
tend to hide more proﬁts in industries that are less concentrated, have more ﬁrms, or have lower
average proﬁt margin. Therefore, for each measure of competitiveness and each deﬁnition of the
market, the empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that competition enhances ﬁrms’
incentives to hide proﬁts.
Using the regression results in Table 3, we gauge the magnitude of the competition eﬀect
on proﬁt hiding to give estimates of its economic signiﬁcance. We set all of the independent
variables at their means, and estimate how much the responsiveness of RPRO to PRO would
change when the competition measure used in the regression changes by one standard deviation.
For example, consider the regression in Column 4 where CONCEN is used to measure
competitiveness. The responsiveness level of RPRO relative to PRO, when all independent
variables take their mean values, is 0.287. It is calculated as the slope of the proﬁt reporting
equation (9) using the estimated coeﬃcients from Column 4 and the means of all independent
variables. If CONCEN increases from its mean, 7.1%, by one standard deviation, to 12.7%,
then the responsiveness of RPRO to PRO increases by 0.019, representing a 6.6% increase from
its previous level. This says that a ﬁrm’s proﬁt hiding propensity decreases by 6.6% when its
industry concentration measured by CONCEN increases by one standard deviation. Similarly,
from Column 2, the economic signiﬁcance PMARGIN is quite large too – a one standard
deviation decrease in proﬁt margin from its mean level, 13.8%, to 9.5%, will lead to a 0.026
decrease in the responsiveness of RPRO to PRO, representing a 9.2% decrease from its previous
level. From Column 3, if LOGN increases by one standard deviation 1.75, the responsiveness of
RPRO to PRO decreases by 0.037, representing a 12.8% decrease from its sample average level.
The economic signiﬁcance of other measures of competitiveness is similar. Take PMARGIN
based on the 3-digit industry as an example (Column 6). All else equal, a one standard deviation
decrease in PMARGIN will lead to a 0.038 decrease in β
1
, which represents a 17.9% decrease
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in the responsiveness of RPRO to PRO (the average responsiveness level of RPRO to PRO in
this speciﬁcation is 0.214). Take H − Index based on the 2-digit industry/region as an example
(Column 8). A one standard deviation decrease in H − Index will lead to a 0.021 decrease in β
1
,
representing a 7.4% decrease in the responsiveness of RPRO to PRO in this speciﬁcation.
5.2 How Does Disparate Tax Rate Aﬀect Firms’ Proﬁt-Hiding Incentives?
Our theoretical model predicts that a ﬁrm’s incentives to hide proﬁts are positively correlated
with its tax rate (Hypothesis 2). From the speciﬁcation of Equation (9), this means β
2
should
be negative. Table 3 shows that in all regressions, the estimated coeﬃcient of TAX × PRO is
negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, higher tax rates reduce the sensitivity of RPRO to
PRO, or in other words, ﬁrms facing higher tax rates report less proﬁts (i.e., hide more proﬁts).
To estimate the economic signiﬁcance of the tax eﬀect on proﬁt hiding, we use the result in
Column 4 of Table 3 as an example. When TAX increases by one standard deviation (0.268), a
ﬁrm will report 0.0279 yuan less of proﬁt. Considering that the average responsiveness of RPRO
to PRO – when all independent variables take their mean values – is 0.287, a 0.0279 yuan
decrease in reported proﬁt represent a reduction of 9.7% from its mean level. Thus, the tax eﬀect
on proﬁt hiding is substantial. Note that the estimates of the coeﬃcient of TAX × PRO are
very close in all the regressions in Table 3, thus the magnitude of the tax eﬀect on proﬁt hiding
should be close if using other regression results.
5.3 Do Financing Constraints Matter?
Our theoretical model predicts that all else equal, a ﬁrm’s incentives to hide proﬁts are negatively
correlated with its access to the capital market (Hypothesis 3). Since higher FINANCE means
better access to the capital market, we expect that β
3
should be positive. It is evident from Table
3 that this hypothesis is strongly supported by our regression results. In all the regressions, the
estimated coeﬃcient of FINANCE × PRO is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. In fact, the
estimates of β
3
are quite stable in all regressions. Thus, in our sample, ﬁrms with better access
to the capital market report more proﬁts.
To estimate the economic signiﬁcance of FINANCE on proﬁt hiding, we use the result in
22
Column 4 of Table 3. When FINANCE increases by one standard deviation (0.023), a ﬁrm will
report 0.008 yuan more of proﬁt, representing a 2.6% reduction of its proﬁt hiding propensity
from its mean level (0.287).
5.4 Do Competitively Disadvantageous Firms Have Stronger Incentives to
Hide Proﬁts?
Our model also predicts that all else equal, ﬁrms with disadvantageous market positions tend to
have greater incentives to hide proﬁts (Hypothesis 4). We use two measures of a ﬁrm’s relative
market position, its size LNLABOR indicating competitively advantageous market position,
and private and collective ownership OWN indicating competitively disadvantageous market
position. Hence, we expect that the estimated coeﬃcient of LNLABOR × PRO, β
4
, to be
positive, and the estimated coeﬃcient of OWN × PRO, β
5
, to be negative.
Table 3 shows that in all regressions, the estimated coeﬃcient of LNLABOR × PRO is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The estimates are in a close range from 0.012 and 0.021.
Thus, in our sample, larger ﬁrms hide less proﬁts, consistent with Hypothesis 4. We use the
results in Column 4 to gauge the economic signiﬁcance of ﬁrm size on a ﬁrm’s proﬁt hiding
propensity. Since β
4
, the coeﬃcient of LNLABOR × PRO is 0.013, a one standard deviation
increase in LNLABOR by 1.06 can increase a ﬁrm’s reported proﬁt by 0.0138, which represents
a 4.8% reduction of the proﬁt hiding propensity at the mean of 0.287. The ﬁrm size eﬀect on
proﬁt hiding is substantial.
From Table 3, it is clear that the estimated coeﬃcient of OWN × PRO is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant in all regressions. The estimates are very close across regressions, ranging
from −0.57 to −0.48. The results suggest that private and collective ﬁrms demonstrate higher
proﬁt hiding propensity than other types of ﬁrms. The economic magnitude is also substantial.
Take the result from Column 4 of Table 3 as an example. Since β
5
, the coeﬃcient of OWN×PRO,
is -0.053, all else equal, a private or collective ﬁrm tends to report 0.052 yuan less of proﬁt. Since
the average responsiveness of RPRO to PRO is 0.287, a private or collective ﬁrm’s proﬁt hiding
propensity is 18.5% higher, all else equal.
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6 Robustness Checks and Extensions
A critical assumption of our empirical strategy is that competition does not aﬀect δ
i,t
– the
parameter that captures the technical relationship between PRO
i,t
and true accounting proﬁt
π
i,t
. In this Section, we check how robust this assumption is. We also examine whether the
empirical results identiﬁed in Section 5 are robust to alternative speciﬁcations.
6.1 Does Competition Aﬀect δ
i,t
?
The discrepancies between π
i,t
and PRO
i,t
are driven by the timing of when revenue and expense
are recognized into income. Similar to Dechow, Kothari, and Watts’ (1998) analysis of the
relation between cash ﬂows and accounting earnings, the discrepancies between π
i,t
and PRO
i,t
in our context are likely to be accounted for by working capital accruals – especially changes in
inventories, receivables, current liabilities, and depreciation. Thus, if competition aﬀects δ
i,t
, it
must do so through these intermediate variables.
However, we ﬁnd no evidence that competitiveness is related to any of these variables. We
compute each of these variables using the information from the NBS dataset. We deﬁne DINV
i,t
as the change in inventories scaled by total assets for ﬁrm i in year t, DCL
i,t
as the change of
current liabilities (liquid liabilities in the NBS database) scaled by total assets, and DCURRD
as the ratio of depreciation in the current year to total assets. Aside from these measures of
working capital accrual, we also deﬁne DIADA as the ratio of intangible assets and deferred
assets to total sales, and ﬁnally EUP
i,t
as the ratio of (un)employment insurance premium to
total sales.
We compute the correlations between these variables and the various competition measures,
and report the results in Panel A of Table 4.
18
As shown in Panel A, all the correlation co-
eﬃcients are extremely small—below 0.0065 in absolute value. Furthermore, most of them are
not statistically signiﬁcant. This indicates that competitiveness does not aﬀect working capital
accruals. Only RCURRD correlates with two competition variables, H − Index and LOGN ,
and DIADA correlated with LOGN , in the statistically signiﬁcant sense. However, as we show
18
For brevity, we only report the correlations between these variables and the competition variables based on
the 2-digit industry codes. Using other market deﬁnitions yields similar results.
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below, adding these variables to our baseline model has no eﬀect on our results.
As a more direct test, we add the above ﬁve variables and their interactions with PRO to the
baseline model (9). We report the results of using the four competition measures based on the
2-digit industry codes in Panel B of Table 4. We ﬁnd that these variables do not enter regressions
signiﬁcantly for most speciﬁcations. Most importantly, as shown in Panel B, controlling for these
variables has almost no eﬀect on our basic results. All estimates of the coeﬃcients of interest
have the same predicted signs and are statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover, the point estimates do
not change much – in quite a few cases they do not change at all (e.g. LNLABOR ∗ PRO).
Lastly, we note that in all results reported earlier, we have included an interaction between
RSALE and PRO to control for diﬀerences in the timing of revenues (expenses) recognition.
The competition eﬀect is clearly not driven by RSALE. We hence conclude that in our data,
competition aﬀects ﬁrms’ proﬁt hiding incentives through d
i,t
, not δ
i,t
.
6.2 Using Diﬀerenced PRO and RPRO
Another concern about our empirical approach is that some unobserved time-invariant ﬁrm or
industry factors other than the ones we have identiﬁed might also aﬀect the responsiveness of
RPRO
i,t
to PRO
i,t
. To address this concern, we replace the proﬁt measures in Equation (9) with
their ﬁrst diﬀerence counterparts, that is, DRPRO
i,t
= RPRO
i,t
−RPRO
i,t−1
and DPRO
i,t
=
PRO
i,t
− PRO
i,t−1
. This speciﬁcation can also serve as an additional way to control for the
timing diﬀerence between PRO
i,t
and π
i,t
.
Table 5 reports the regression results, where we use competition variables based on the three
diﬀerent market deﬁnitions. Using the diﬀerenced proﬁt measures yields similar competition
eﬀects. For example, the estimated coeﬃcients of Compet×DPRO in all regressions are statis-
tically signiﬁcant and have expected signs. That is, as competitiveness increases, the sensitivities
of the changes in reported proﬁts, DRPRO, to the changes in PRO, DPRO, become smaller.
The result provides further empirical support for our hypothesis that competition enhances ﬁrms’
proﬁt hiding incentives. We also ﬁnd that TAX×PRO, FINANCE×PRO, and OWN×PRO
all have the signs and signiﬁcance levels consistent with our model predictions. The estimates of
LNLABOR× PRO are not signiﬁcant for some speciﬁcations, but have expected signs.
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6.3 Including Lagged PRO As A Control Variable
Another possible factor behind the timing diﬀerence between PRO
i,t
and π
i,t
is that ﬁrms may try
to smooth income over time. To control for this possibility, we allow RPRO
i,t
to be responsive to
both PRO
i,t
and PRO
i,t−1
. Speciﬁcally, we include the lagged PRO as an additional independent
variable in the baseline model (9). We report the results in Panel A of Table 6. The coeﬃcients
of the lagged PRO are statistically signiﬁcant in all regressions, suggesting that ﬁrms’ reported
proﬁts do depend on their PRO in the previous year. However, all of our previous results hold
after controlling for lagged PRO. In all cases, the estimated coeﬃcients have the predicted signs
and are statistically signiﬁcant.
6.4 RPRO Being Responsive to PROs in Various Years
As our last robustness check, we suppose that ﬁrms’ reported proﬁts respond to both last year’s
and this year’s fundamental earnings, PRO. We specify the model as follows:
RPRO
i,t
= (β
0
+ β
1
Compet+ β
2
TAX + β
3
FINANCE + β
4
LNLABOR+ β
5
OWN + β
6
RSALE
+
∑
i=year
β
i
d
year
+
∑
j=loc
β
j
d
loc
) ∗ PRO
i,t
+ (λ
0
+ λ
1
Compet+ λ
2
TAX + λ
3
FINANCE
+λ
4
LNLABOR+ λ
5
OWN + λ
6
RSALE +
∑
i=year
λ
i
d
year
+
∑
j=loc
λ
j
d
loc
) ∗ PRO
i,t−1
+α
1
Compet+ α
2
TAX + α
3
FINANCE + α
4
LNLABOR+ α
5
OWN + α
6
RSALE
+
∑
i=year
α
i
d
year
+
∑
j=loc
α
j
d
loc
+ 
i,t
, (10)
where the sum of β and λ measures the true sensitivities of RPRO to PRO.
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The previous test
where lagged PRO is used as a control variable is a special case of Equation (10) in that all λ’s
are set to zero except λ
0
.
The regressions results are reported in Panel B of Table 6, where we suppress the estimated
coeﬃcients of other variables and only report β
0
+ λ
0
, β
1
+ λ
1
, β
2
+ λ
2
,β
3
+ λ
3
, β
4
+ λ
4
, and
β
5
+ λ
5
. We also test whether the sums are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. As shown in Panel
19
We also allow RPRO
i,t
to respond to PRO
i,t−2
, or PRO
i,t+1
. These experiments greatly reduce our sample
size, but yield qualitatively similar results.
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B, β
1
+ λ
1
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in all regressions and have the expected signs.
Thus, competition not only aﬀects the responsiveness of RPRP
i,t
to PRO
i,t
, but also aﬀect its
responsiveness to PRO
i,t−1
. This implies that even if ﬁrms smooth income over time, competition
pressure enhances ﬁrms’ incentives to hide proﬁts. From Table 6, it is clear that all our other
results also continue to hold: the signs and levels of signiﬁcance of other variables are consistent
with our model predictions.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that competition pressure drives Chinese industrial ﬁrms to hide
more proﬁts. Our study provides evidence that in a market environment with poor institutional
infrastructure, competition may very well encourage unethical or illegal activities as ﬁrms use
all possible instruments to gain competitive advantage. Thus, policies intended to promote
competition in developing and transition economies must be accompanied by reforms which
improve the institutional infrastructure. Such reforms would include improved tax enforcement,
strengthened ﬁnancial market regulation, and a more developed legal system to protect property
rights and enforce contracts.
We also ﬁnd strong evidence that ﬁrms that are competitively disadvantaged (e.g., smaller
ﬁrms, ﬁrms facing high tax rates, ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, and private or collective ﬁrms)
hide a larger share of their proﬁts. Our ﬁndings suggest that in order for competition to deliver
desirable social outcomes, it is crucial that all market participants have the same opportunities.
This lesson is especially relevant for countries like China, where government policies and regu-
lations routinely favor some ﬁrms over others. Such discriminatory practices not only result in
allocation ineﬃciency, but also force ﬁrms that are discriminated against to ﬁnd ways to com-
pensate their disadvantages. These compensating behaviors often include socially unproductive
behaviors like proﬁt hiding or bribery of government oﬃcials, which can be very harmful in the
long run, further deteriorating already weak institutions.
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8 Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: Let us deﬁne
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From Equations (1) and (2), we obtain, for i = s,
d
s
t
= 1− τ
s
t
(1− τ
s
t
)
x
s
t
∆
(11)
e
s
t
= −
y
s
t
∆
(12)
and for i = w,
d
w
t
= 1− τ
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t
(1− τ
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t
)
x
w
t
∆
(13)
e
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t
= −
y
w
t
∆
(14)
Since γ > max{µ
j
(τ
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t
)
2
(n − 2) − c
s
t
(τ
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t
)
2
, µ
j
(τ
w
t
)
2
(m − 2) − c
w
t
(τ
w
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2
} (otherwise the model
has no solution), ∆ is decreasing in µ
j
, n and m, while x
s
t
is clearly increasing in µ
j
, n and m.
Therefore, d
s
t
is decreasing in µ
j
, n and m. Similarly, d
w
t
is decreasing in µ
j
, n and m. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Note that for τ
s
t
≤ 0.5, τ
s
t
(1 − τ
s
t
) is increasing in τ
s
t
. In addition,
x
s
t
is independent of τ
s
t
. When c
s
t
≤ µ
j
(n− 2), ∆ is decreasing in τ
s
t
. From Equation (11), d
s
t
is
decreasing in τ
s
t
. Since x
s
t
is decreasing in c
s
t
and ∆ is increasing in c
s
t
, then d
s
t
must be increasing
in c
s
t
. Similar conclusions hold for d
w
t
. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3: From Equations (11) and (13), d
s
t
> d
w
t
when τ
s
t
(1− τ
s
t
)x
s
t
< τ
w
t
(1−
τ
w
t
)x
w
t
, or when x
s
t
< x
w
t
(since τ
s
t
= τ
w
t
). It is easy to verify that
x
w
t
− x
s
t
= µ
j
γ[(m− n) + c
s
t
− c
w
t
]
Since m > n and c
s
t
> c
w
t
, we have d
s
t
> d
w
t
. Q.E.D.
9 Data Appendix
Data for this study are primarily from the annual accounting brieﬁng reports ﬁled by all industrial
ﬁrms with the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) during the 1995 - 2002 period. Before
1995, due to changes in accounting rules and collection methods, ﬁrm-level information collected
by the NBS was fragmented and inconsistent. In 1995, China conducted its third nationwide
industrial census. The NBS introduced a more rigorous and internally consistent statistical
reporting system in preparation for the 1995 industrial census. As a result, the quality of data
collection and database management has improved substantially. The NBS database compiles
ﬁrm level information on large and medium-sized industrial ﬁrms annually to calculate the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). The database covers more than 20,000 ﬁrms annually in thirty-seven
two-digit industries and 28 provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities.
To ensure the reliability of our analysis, we screened the original ﬁrm-level data and deleted
problematic observations. Speciﬁcally, we deleted those observations whose information on crit-
ical parameters (such as total assets, the number of employees, gross value of industrial output,
net value of ﬁxed assets, or sales) was missing and those misclassiﬁed observations whose opera-
tion scales were clearly much smaller than the classiﬁcation standards of large and medium-sized
ﬁrms. The latter type of deleted observations includes ﬁrms whose operation scales measured by
one of the following: (i) the value of ﬁxed assets, (ii) the total value of intermediate inputs, (iii)
the total value of industrial output, (iv) the total sales, or (v) the total assets, is less than RMB
100,000. It also includes ﬁrms who have fewer than 30 employees, or have one of the following
variables at a negative value: (i) the total assets minus liquid assets, (ii) the total assets minus
total ﬁxed assets, (iii) the total assets minus net value of ﬁxed assets, or (iv) the accumulated
depreciation minus current depreciation is negative.
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Historical factors may underlie the misclassiﬁcations. The classiﬁcation criteria for industrial
ﬁrms were established in April 1988 by several government agencies, and were based on the
measurement of quantity rather than value. These criteria, a legacy of the centrally planned
economy, are being phased out. However, the coexistence of diﬀerent selection criteria may lead
to some misclassiﬁcations.
Based on the above selection criteria, we deleted, from year to year, between 2% and 4.8% of
observations from the original data source. We did not observe any signiﬁcant cross-ownership,
cross-industry, or geographical patterns in the probability of an observation being dropped, which
implies that the “bad data” problem has been random.
After the screening, we have more than 20,000 ﬁrms for each year from 1995 to 2002. To ensure
that a few outlier observations do not determine our results, we delete ﬁrm-year observations with
variable values either below the 1% level or above the 99% level. Our ﬁnal sample consists of
163,618 ﬁrm-year observations.
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